No Baby, No Job? Why Fewer Births Aren’t Bringing More Women to Work

The female labor force participation rate measures the share of women who are economically active, while the total fertility rate is the average number of children a woman would have.

Some upper-middle-income countries in Asia, such as the People’s Republic of China and Thailand, have experienced a simultaneous decline of both female labor force participation and fertility over the last three decades. They are not the only countries experiencing this trend.

From 1990 to 2023, against a global decline in fertility, the trends in female labor force participation across countries at different income levels diverged. A continuous declining trend is observed in low-income and upper-middle-income countries, while high-income countries show an upward trend in their female labor force participation. A counterintuitive pattern, therefore, unfolds: declining fertility rates do not necessarily go hand in hand with higher female labor force participation.

These trends point to an emerging dual challenge for developing economies. When both fertility and women’s labor force participation decline simultaneously, economies face a shrinking labor supply while population aging accelerates. This combination can constrain economic growth, weaken productivity gains, and deepen gender inequalities in labor markets.

Amid widespread concern about falling fertility, especially in some upper-middle-income countries, the decline in women’s labor force participation in these contexts is equally alarming. Understanding the factors that shape how demographic and labor market transitions interact is therefore critical.

Figure 1: Trajectory of Fertility–Labor Nexus by Income Group, 1990–2023

HIC = high-income country, LIC = low-income country, LMIC = lower-middle-income country, UMIC = upper-middle-income country.
Note: Trend lines with arrows start from 1990 and end in 2023. They show how the trajectories of the fertility–labor nexus of countries at different income levels move in the past 3 decades.
Source: World Bank Open Data (accessed 7 July 2025). Data analyzed by the author.

If we examine the total fertility rate and female labor force participation nexus globally in 2023, the majority of high-income countries clustered with moderate female labor force participation and low total fertility rates. Among these rich countries, Nordic countries stand out with both relatively higher female labor force participation and higher fertility.

A key reason is their strong welfare systems, lower social inequality, and policies that reduce the trade-offs between work and family life.

Figure 2: Global Snapshot of Fertility–Labor Nexus, 2023

HIC=high-income country.
Note: If a country is both a high-income country and an ADB developing member country (DMC), it is marked with a blue dot.
Source: World Bank Open Data (accessed 7 July 2025). Data analyzed by the author.

Figure 3: Fertility–Labor Nexus Across Selected OECD Countries, 1990 and 2023

Source: World Bank Open Data (accessed 7 July 2025). Data analyzed by the author.

This bears strong implications for how countries approach social policy. How societies build their social safety nets and address wealth gaps plays a key role in coordinating the fertility–labor nexus. These mechanisms help sustain female labor force participation while avoiding extremely low fertility by reducing work–family trade-offs.

Governments should design social policies using a human-centered approach to address or prepare for these evolving fertility and labor dynamics, as more countries may experience rapid aging before they grow rich.

Addressing these challenges requires integrated approaches that jointly address labor market institutions, care provision systems, and gender-responsive urban and transport planning. Three areas are particularly important:

• Reconnect workplace and family
  In large Asian cities, structurally shortening commute times would alleviate time burdens and help people balance family and work. Governments should revisit their housing and urban planning policies as well as public transport systems with a target of addressing women’s “time poverty.”

  Complementary workplace policies such as remote work, flexible working hours, and hybrid arrangements can further alleviate time constraints in sectors and occupations where such arrangements are feasible.

• Reaffirm legal and policy support for gender equality in the workplace
  Women should be targeted for upskilling programs and supported by inclusive, fair labor market policies so that they are capable of equally competing for and taking on technical and managerial positions.

  Governments must also strengthen protections for workers in precarious and non-standard employment, jobs in which women tend to predominate and which are increasingly prevalent in decentralized and platform-based economies.

  Policy frameworks also need to anticipate and mitigate the displacement risks associated with artificial intelligence, particularly for undereducated women who are more vulnerable to automation-related inequalities, including widening income gaps. Discrimination against women at any stage of their careers and in specific sectors should be explicitly prohibited.

• Redistribute care responsibilities
  Social policy and infrastructure should be in place for a more inclusive, equal, and affordable “care system,” including early childhood education, schooling, medical care and insurance, and the delivery of quality and accessible elderly care.

  Community-based care cooperatives offer promising supplementary models, particularly for working parents. Well-designed social assistance schemes are also critical to cushioning the most vulnerable households and ensuring that care responsibilities do not translate into persistent labor market exclusion or poverty risks.

The global fertility–labor nexus cannot be adequately explained by income growth or demographic transition alone. It reflects deeper structural, institutional, and policy arrangements that shape women’s and families’ opportunities and constraints.

In Asia and the Pacific, where many countries face rapid aging before reaching high-income status, addressing the emerging dual challenge of declines in female labor force participation and fertility requires integrated social policy reforms.

Coordinated interventions to ensure work–family balance, gender equality in labor markets, and care redistribution can help address these demographic and labor market challenges and sustain inclusive growth.

D. E. Bloom et al. 2009. Fertility, Female Labor Force Participation, and the Demographic Dividend. Journal of Economic Growth. 14 (2). pp. 79–101.

F. Huang. 2026. Reassessing the Fertility–Labor Nexus: Why Gender Equality and Social Policy Matter. ADB Briefs. No. 412. Asian Development Bank.

G. Esping-Andersen. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.

M. Doepke et al. 2023. The Economics of Fertility: A New Era. In S. Lundberg and A. Voena, eds. Handbook of the Economics of the Family. 1(1). pp. 151–254

S. Tanaka and M. Muzones. 2016. Female Labor Force Participation in Asia: Key Trends, Constraints, and Opportunities. ADB Briefs. No. 71. ADB.