Protecting and Enhancing Multilateral Rules on Export Restrictions

Multilateral trade negotiations are held at the World Trade Organization. Photo credit: Kenji Takamiya.

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Adhering to rules on quantitative restrictions and pursuing multilateral talks on export tariffs may help contain adverse economic impacts.

Introduction

Countries across the globe appear eager to enhance their export competitiveness but at the same time, authorities have also been adopting trade measures which seemingly have the opposite policy orientation: restricting exports.

According to the 2025 report by the World Trade Organization (WTO) based on notifications by 62 of its 166 members, there are 2,249 measures of quantitative restrictions on trade presently in force and 40% of them are on exports (whereas 60% are on imports). These include non-automatic export licensing, export prohibitions, and export quotas but exclude price-based measures including, most importantly, export tariffs. The total number of quantitative restrictions on exports and export tariffs could be substantially higher if all WTO members were taken into account.

Economic Effects in Theory

Theoretically speaking, export restrictions may have negative economic impacts on small countries that implement them, as in the case of import restrictions, all other things being equal. Export quotas (including prohibition of export, which is zero quota) and export tariffs could be beneficial or disadvantageous, depending on the economic entity within a country. However, these result in overall efficiency losses as they cause market distortion. Under export restrictions, consumers would likely gain from cheaper price and better product availability, while the producer would suffer from a loss or decline in profitable market access. Cheaper inputs would also ease exports of industries that use them. However, it would be extremely difficult for the government to design and implement a commercial policy to promote a specific industry, especially through an indirect measure like export restrictions.

The impact of export restrictions by large economies—that can exercise market power to manipulate the terms of trade in their favor—is more complicated. The overall impact can be measured through terms of trade gains minus efficiency losses, whose combined effect could either be positive or negative. The pursuit of improvements in terms of trade would benefit a large economy but only at the cost of loss for its trading partners. This nature of export restrictions may trigger retaliation by the latter and potentially, a trade war whereby no country wins.

Export restrictions could also become a tool to serve non-economic objectives that are recognized in global trade rules. WTO members that earlier reported quantitative restrictions cited as reasons, among others, the protection of human, animal or plant life, or health and national securities for using trade-distorting measures.

Case for Multilateral Rules

Retaining and enhancing global trade rules on quantitative restrictions and tariffs on exports can help contain their adverse economic impacts. First, a discipline on export restrictions helps avoid efficiency losses for small and large economies. Second, the multilateral process that reciprocally eliminates or reduces export restraints by large economies could help reduce the possibility of retaliation and trade war among trading partners.

As far as quantitative restrictions are concerned, Article XI: 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) generally prohibits use of quantitative restrictions on both exports and imports.

This general rule is accompanied by clauses on exceptions that relates to some broader economic and non-economic objectives but are highly qualified with conditional languages. GATT Article XI:2 grants exceptions to the ban on quantitative restrictions, for instance, to prevent or relieve critical shortages of food or other essential products only when these are applied “temporarily.” In addition, GATT Article XX on general exceptions allows use of trade policy measures where “necessary” to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources only if they are “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.” Further, the chapeau of Article XX stresses that policy measures should not be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.” GATT Article XXI on security exceptions sets more relaxed disciplines on measures adopted in pursuit of national security.

Potential Areas of Future Negotiations

While existing multilateral rules address quantitative restraints on exports, these hardly tackle taxes on exports, in sharp contrast to those on imports. Historically, market access negotiations for trade in goods conducted under the auspices of the former GATT and the present WTO have been dedicated predominantly to the reduction of import duties. Commitments on import tariff rates have been bound in the schedule of commitments and became part of the broader WTO law. However, there have been no binding obligations on export tariffs, except for part of the countries that have joined the multilateral trading system since 1995 and made commitments on export duties in their terms of WTO accession. This asymmetric coverage of tariff bindings between imports and exports creates a potentially critical loophole for adoption of distortionary export duties—a gap that should be closed.

Resources

C. P. Bown. 2025. How Export Restrictions Threaten Economic Security. Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper. 25-11.

D. Lederman and A. Alessandro Barattieri. 2024. The Double-Edged Sword of Export Bans on Critical Metals. World Bank Blogs.

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. 2010. The Economic Impact of Export Restrictions on Raw Materials. OECD Trade Policy Studies.

WTO. 2023. International Export Regulations and Control: Navigating the Global Framework Beyond WTO Rules. WTO.

WTO. 2010. World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources. WTO.

Kenji Takamiya
Principal Economist, Central and West Asia Department, Asian Development Bank

Prior to joining ADB, Kenji Takamiya worked at the Japan International Cooperation Agency and a commercial bank. He holds a PhD and an MPhil, both from Cambridge University, an MA from Yale University, and an Executive Certificate from Harvard Kennedy School. He is the author of Recently Acceded Members of the World Trade Organization.

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